Russia's emerging multinational companies amidst the global economic crisis by Filippov, S.
  
 
Russia's emerging multinational companies amidst
the global economic crisis
Citation for published version (APA):
Filippov, S. (2011). Russia's emerging multinational companies amidst the global economic crisis. (UNU-
MERIT Working Papers; No. 003). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research
and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2011
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#2011-003 
 
Russia's emerging multinational companies amidst the global economic crisis 
Sergey Filippov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499, email: info@merit.unu.edu, URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 
   
Working Paper Series 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and 
Technology, UNU-MERIT 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
1 
 
 
 
RUSSIA’S EMERGING MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 
AMIDST THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
 
Dr. Sergey Filippov 
 
Assistant Professor of Innovation Management 
Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management 
E-mail: s.filippov@tudelft.nl 
URL: www.filippov.eu 
 
 
21 January 2011 
 
Abstract: 
Internationalisation of Russian companies has become a distinctive phenomenon and has 
drawn attention of scholars, practitioners and policy-makers alike. Newly emerged Russian 
companies have extended their presence from the nearest former Soviet republics to the 
advanced markets of Western Europe and Northern America. As most companies in the 
world, in 2008-2010, Russian multinationals faced the global economic meltdown. Despite 
the broad interest in this topic, its scholarly examination remains limited so far. This is 
precisely the objective of the paper. It analyses the impact, effects and consequences of the 
global economic crisis on international activities and internationalisation strategies of 
emerging Russian multinationals. The study combines quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Available secondary data from international financial and business databases and reviews is 
used. To broaden the insight gained through these quantitative analyses, the paper also present 
qualitative data – several practical examples of Russian multinationals’ responses to the crisis. 
Further, the interplay between foreign expansion and the Russian government’s policies is 
explored. A number of conclusions are derived. 
 
Key words: global crisis, outward foreign direct investment, acquisitions, strategy, emerging 
multinationals, Russia, corporate governance 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-2010 that was triggered by a liquidity shortfall in the U.S. 
banking system has resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks 
by national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. The crisis is 
considered by many to be the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. It has led to the failure of multinational companies and key businesses, decline in 
consumer wealth, and a significant drop in economic activity worldwide.  
As the crisis unfolded globally, its impact became pronounced both for developed and 
emerging economies. Consequently, the global downturn has impacted both western 
multinational companies and ‘emerging multinationals’ – multinational companies originating 
from emerging economies. Many multinationals have had to deal with falling demand and 
tightening access to loans. In the same fashion, the crisis has negatively impacted the 
internationalisation plans of emerging multinationals lacking finances for further expansion. 
In spite of the negative effect of the crisis on emerging economies and emerging 
multinationals, it is often argued that the main drivers of the global economic growth will be 
the emerging economies. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts recovery of the global 
economy in 2011 with the world economic growth of around 3 per cent, at the same time, the 
economic growth in developed economies will constitute only slightly above 1 per cent. On 
the other hand, emerging economies will witness a 7 per cent growth (The Economist, 2010). 
Likewise, the world might see an accelerated growth of emerging multinationals. Specifically 
in the times of crisis, distressed assets from western companies, or whole business units 
became attractive targets for acquisition. Volvo’s acquisition by Chinese automaker Geely 
provides an illustrative example. In 2009, amidst the economic downturn, Geely Holding 
Group announced that it was close to an agreement to acquire Volvo Cars from Ford Motor 
Company; and a $1.8 billion deal was signed on 28 March 2010. 
Many scholarly studies, policy reports and practitioner-oriented publications have sought to 
examine various facets of the global crisis, both from macro- and micro-economic 
perspectives. Several studies have examined the impact of the economic crisis on emerging 
multinationals. Yet, this subject remains an under-researched area, and this paper aims to 
contribute to it. The study focuses on emerging Russian multinationals. Prior to the global 
downturn, these companies, many of whom operate in the natural resources sector, had 
benefited greatly from staggering natural-resource commodity prices and had extended their 
foreign presence from the neighbouring republics to advanced western economies. Their 
responses to the global economic crisis, however, have been mixed, from contraction to even 
further expansion. This is the objective of the paper – to trace internationalisation strategies of 
emerging Russian multinationals and to analyse impact of the global financial crisis on these 
strategies.  
The study combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Available data from international 
financial and business databases is used. To broaden the insight gained through these 
quantitative analyses, the paper also present qualitative data – several practical examples of 
Russian multinationals’ responses to the crisis.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the topics of 
emerging multinationals and effects of crisis on internationalisation paths of these companies. 
Section 3 provides a background of the study; it portrays the effect of the crisis on the Russian 
economy and the policy responses of the Russian government. Section 4 analyses effects of 
the crisis on Russian multinationals and reactions of these companies to the crisis. Finally, 
Section 5 draws main conclusions of the study, provides managerial and policy implications 
and outlines directions for further research. 
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2. Theoretical background  
This section provides a brief overview of the concept of the emerging multinationals and 
studies of responses of multinational companies to the economic crisis. 
 
2.1. Emerging multinationals 
The academic literature on multinational companies originating from emerging markets has 
grown explosively in the recent years. Further, several edited volumes have been published on 
the topic of outward FDI from emerging economies and emerging multinationals (e.g. 
Goldstein and Shaw, 2007; Benito and Narula, 2007; Ramamurti and Singh, 2008; Sauvant et 
al, 2010). Several special journal issues have appeared, including the special issue of 
Industrial and Corporate Change (volume 18, issue 2) on the Internationalisation of Chinese 
and Indian Firms: Trends, Motivations and Strategy, and the special issue of the International 
Journal on Emerging Markets (volume 5, issue 3/4) on Emerging Multinationals. Besides, 
international organisations have also paid considerable attention to the internationalisation of 
firms from emerging economies. In 2006 both OECD and UNCTAD published reports 
dedicated to emerging multinationals (UNCTAD, 2006; OECD, 2006).  
Child and Rodriguez (2005) among the first authors examined internationalisation of Chinese 
firms and raised a question whether the existing theory of MNC should be revised. Likewise, 
Buckley et al (2007) studied the determinants of Chinese outward FDI. Gammeltoft (2008) 
provided a comparative analysis of outward FDI from BRICS countries. Andreff (2007) 
focussed on the emerging economies from economies in transition. The study of Mathews 
(2006) covered emerging Asian multinationals. Mathews (2006) argues that ‘new’, emerging 
multinationals adopt a different perspective to the resources accessed through 
internationalisation, relying on ‘linkage, leverage and learning’ of international resources 
rather adopting the eclectic OLI (Ownership, Locational, Internalisation) paradigm by 
Dunning (1981).  
The ‘eclectic paradigm’ originally proposed by John Dunning (1981) represent the most 
influential approach to study the international activities of multinational companies and can 
be considered as the mainstream in the theory of internationalisation of firms. This eclectic 
paradigm can be considered as an ‘envelope’ for the existing theories of internationalisation, 
with the addition of a new attention to the locational choice of investments (Dunning, 2000). 
In its essence, the eclectic paradigm postulates that the decision of firms to expand their 
activities abroad via FDI can be explained by three different advantages. Ownership (O) 
advantage represents the ownership of specific resources to be exploited externally. Location 
(L) advantage depends on the characteristics of the host country and opportunities it offers. 
Internalisation (I) advantage depends on the opportunity to internalise firm-specific 
advantages rather than to exploit them on the markets through other transactions. 
Dunning (2006) acknowledged deficiencies of the Ownership advantages of emerging 
multinationals by arguing that emerging multinationals internationalise via a two-stage model: 
first, by investing in more advanced economies ‘to access or to augment, rather than exploit 
their ownership advantages’, and the nature of the second stage of internationalisation would 
follow the logic of OLI paradigm. Narula (2010) argues that firms engaging in strategic asset-
seeking are primarily seeking learning opportunities rather than seeking to invest for strategic 
purposes in specific assets. This is in line with the claim that emerging multinational 
companies internationalise in order to enhance their ownership advantages. In the same vein, 
Goldstein (2007: 81) argues, ‘If they invest abroad, it is not on the basis of ‘O’, and the 
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parameters that determine the degree of ‘I’ in their foreign operations are different’. These 
firms internationalise in order to get access to the strategic resources abroad they need. 
Another fundamental contribution by John Dunning (1993) is a widely used typology of 
motivations drawing FDI. They are: (1) resources-seeking investments aimed at accessing 
unique resources specific to foreign locations (e.g. natural resources), (2) market-seeking 
investments aimed at entering new markets, (3) efficiency-seeking investments pursuing an 
efficient specialisation of firms, and (4) strategic asset-seeking investments aimed at 
augmenting the set of proprietary resources of firms. 
The key precondition to become engaged in foreign investments is that a firm must possess 
some unique competitive advantage, or firm-specific advantages (FSA). The multinational 
company needs to build on some type of FSA that, at the simplest level, is nonlocation-bound, 
i.e., easily transferable across borders as an intermediate product. It can be either a functional, 
production-related proprietary asset, typically technological, manufacturing or marketing 
know-how, or an organisational capability to efficiently coordinate and control the 
multinational company’s asset base. Hence, the FSA concept covers a very broad set of 
unique company strengths (competencies and capabilities). The importance of FSA transfer to 
explain performance of the multinational company has become a pivotal in the international 
business literature (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Also, Alan Rugman identifies country 
specific advantages (CSA). The CSAs are the location-bound, exogenous factors in a 
multinational company’s home-market. The CSAs result from the home country’s economic 
and institutional environments, such as labour force, factor endowments, government policies, 
national culture, productive reputation, or institutional framework. In fact, both FSA and CSA 
can be related to the O and L advantages of the OLI framework. 
Specifically, in the case of emerging multinationals, drawing upon the Dunning’s typology of 
FDI motives, UNCTAD (2006) identify resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking factors as the main reasons for outward FDI from emerging countries to the emerging 
/ developing countries. On the contrary, strategic asset-seeking motives are dominant for 
outward FDI from emerging economies to developed countries. Reflecting on CSA, the 
domestic environment may be an important advantage for emerging multinationals, such as 
the low cost of factors (Barnard, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007) and the monopolistic power at 
home (Andreff, 2002). The CSA may serve as a push factor; for instance, home country 
government policies may create a favourable framework for outward FDI. 
In the context of emerging multinationals, the main focus has been placed on China and India, 
and Brazil. Russian companies have received less attention. Yet, a stream of literature 
focusing on emerging Russian multinationals can be identified (e.g. Bulatov, 2001; Crane et 
al., 2005; Heinrich, 2003, 2006; Kalotay, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008; Kets de Vries et al, 
2004; Vahtra and Liuhto, 2006; Filippov, 2010). Besides, Moscow School of Management 
‘Skolkovo’ published a number of analytical reports on the international expansion of Russian 
companies.  
These papers have examined various facets of Russian companies’ internationalisation 
trajectories, such as first attempts to reconnect with former Soviet trade and production 
networks, to expand into the ‘near-abroad’ of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), and to search out resources or assets to enhance or compliment domestic production. 
Several studies addressed the export strategies of Russian multinationals, taking into account 
the impact of foreign partners’ presence, turnover of senior management, product 
development strategies on export intensity and so on. 
The studies on the internationalisation paths and strategies of Russian companies suggest that 
the motivation of their internationalisation does not always fall into the traditional four 
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categories outlined by Dunning (1988) – market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-
seeking and strategic assets-seeking. Among other factors of internationalisation are ‘push’ 
factors, such as unstable economic situation at the home base, i.e. a “system escape” 
motivation (Bulatov, 1998). This proposition is corroborated by the Index of Economic 
Freedom, annually compiled by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation. It has 
consistently placed Russia at the bottom of its list; and in the 2011 edition, Russia was ranked 
143th (out of 179 countries), below other key emerging economies – Brazil (113), India (124), 
China (135). Besides, political considerations are often cited as drivers of the 
internationalisation of (state-owned) Russian companies. Liuhto and Vahtra (2007) proposed 
a typology of Russian multinationals on the basis of the ownership structures and the level of 
state involvement in their operations. The focus on ownership structure and the state 
involvement provide a strong indication about an important role of the Russian state in the 
internationalisation strategies of many Russian companies. Russia’s economic and 
institutional environments, such as labour force, factor endowments, government policies and 
institutional framework can be seen not only from a negative perspective, but from a positive 
one too, as they represent CSA for many Russian companies too, especially for the state-
owned ones. 
 
2.2. Multinational companies and the economic crisis 
The current global economic crisis became an object of scholarly analysis. Several studies 
adopted a macroeconomics perspective. For example, Dejuan et al (2011) studied the impact 
of the crisis on the global economy on a macro-level; Forrest and Yip (2011) investigated the 
impact of the crisis on households. Other publications sought to study the financial side of the 
crisis (Gup, 2010; Allen, 2009). Gray (2009) investigated financial contagion in the EU – 
mechanisms of spill over of the crisis to the national currencies of 8 EU member states, not 
part of the Eurozone. Shabri Abd Majid and Hj Kassim (2009) studied the impact of the crisis 
on the emerging equity markets, with particular reference to Asia. Several studies were 
devoted to the regulatory responses of national governments to the crisis (Goodhart, 2009; 
Green et al, 2011). Desai (2010) offered a macro-economic overview of the financial crisis’ 
dynamics in Russia and policy responses. 
Regarding the impact of the crisis on FDI and multinational companies, several studies 
emerged. Enderwick (2009) studied how exposure to the dynamic conditions of emerging 
markets can contribute to strategic adaptation and international competitiveness of western 
multinationals. Six differentiated strategies are identified; and illustrations are drawn 
primarily from the global automobile industry. Filippov and Kalotay (2011, forthcoming) 
investigated responses of multinational companies to the crisis in the context of new EU 
member states, both in terms of new FDI inflows and response strategies of already 
established foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies. Pradhan (2009) provided an 
overview of the dynamics of Indian outward FDI in the period of the economic recession, 
showing a decline in the investment and expansionary activity. 
Sauvant et al (2010) present an analysis of outward FDI by four BRIC economies and the 
impact of the financial crisis and recession. The crisis affects the ability of emerging 
multinationals to invest abroad. This difficulty is further accentuated by declining earnings, 
weakening balance sheets and the need for deleveraging. As a consequence, a number of 
emerging multinationals already had to divest themselves of foreign affiliates or repatriate a 
larger share of their foreign earnings. However, state-owned multinationals in countries with 
high foreign currency reserves remain in a position to expand abroad. Crisis provides a good 
moment for them as asset prices in a number of potential host counties are low or in distress. 
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In terms of policy responses, Sauvant et al (2010) warn about the rise of FDI protectionism 
that may make it more difficult for emerging multinational to expand their international 
production networks. A deepening crisis may well lead to more FDI protectionism and 
discourage investments from emerging markets though. 
The impact of the crisis on emerging multinationals is also regarded within the framework of 
the Emerging Market Global Players project, a collaborative effort led by the Vale Columbia 
Centre bringing together researchers on FDI to produce annual reports identifying the top 
multinationals from each of a number of emerging markets. Presently it includes reports on 
ten countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Slovenia and 
Turkey) covering some 200 emerging multinationals. 
Specifically in the case of Russia, the interplay between the global economic crisis and the 
internationalisation of Russian companies was raised by Skolkovo Research (2009). An 
analytical report published in May 2009 presented an analysis the crisis adjustment of Russian 
multinationals, in comparison with their Chinese counterparts. The report noted a decrease in 
investment activity as the expansion of Russian multinationals had been stifled by the lack of 
external financing. The most severely affected were companies engaged in scale-seeking 
expansion (in metals/mining sector); in contrast companies involved in downstream 
integration (in oil and gas sector) were not hit hard. Expansion of Russian companies into the 
emerging markets was slowing but had not stopped. Amidst the crisis, in early 2009, the 
prospects looked mixed. Access to financing and the protectionism (of host governments) 
seemed as the two most evident challenges. 
Due to the novelty of the research topic, currently the stream of literature on the interplay of 
the international expansion of emerging multinationals and their (post-)crisis adjustments is 
only being shaped. The extant body of literature remains inconclusive regarding specific 
responses and strategic choices of emerging multinationals, and particularly, Russian 
companies. 
 
3. The impact of the global financial crisis on Russia 
This section provides an overview of the effects of the global economic crisis on the Russian 
economy as well as policy responses by the Russian government. 
 
3.1. Crisis in Russia 
The decade between the 1998 Russian economic crisis and the current global economic crisis 
was characterised by Russia’s growing economy and improvement in living standards. The 
country enjoyed rapid increase in its GDP and growth of foreign exchanges reserves. The 
Russian government paid off its sovereign debt (including the inherited Soviet debt). One of 
the reasons of this economic performance was the national currency devaluation carried out in 
the course of the 1998 crisis; and further the growth of economy was facilitated by political 
stability. Among the external factors, high world prices on commodities, specifically, on oil 
and gas, were key to the economic growth. It is at the 2000s that domestic Russian companies 
began pursuing internationalisation strategies. 
The financial downfall in the US and the following global chain reaction has had strong 
impact on Russia’s economy. Russia’s export-oriented commodities faced a situation where 
demand and prices fell; oil prices fell sharply from nearly $100 in 2008 to $62 in 2009 per 
barrel. Russian stock market plummeted and the value of Russian companies had been wiped 
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off. Similarly, Russia’s foreign reserves fell sharply as the Central Bank of Russia adopted a 
policy of gradual devaluation of the national currency.  
The crisis exposed internal weaknesses of the Russian economy such as the weak banking 
system, causing a liquidity crisis in the country. Banks raised interest rates for loans, and as a 
result, the access of Russian companies both to domestic and foreign credit became reduced 
and complicated. Not to say that many banks even went bankrupt themselves. The decline in 
the economic activity has inevitably adversely affected Russia’s economic growth. In the first 
half of 2009, when Russia was hit hardest by the crisis, its GDP fell by 10.4% compared to 
the same period in the previous year, and industrial production dropped by nearly 15%. This 
economic performance affected the federal budget as the deficit was recorded for the first 
time in ten years.  
Foreign investors pulled billions of dollars out of Russia; and the inflow of FDI decreased as 
the consequence of the suppressed investing activity of the global business. Table 1 presents 
an overview of Russia’s FDI and cross-border M&A statistics for the years 2007-2009, as 
reported by UNCTAD. In the pre-crisis year of 2007, the annual inward FDI inflow in Russia 
constituted $ 55 billion, or 20.2% of the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). In 2009 this 
amount decreased to $ 38.7 billion, or 14.7% of GFCF. The year 2009 witnessed global 
decline in FDI activity and as many other countries Russia became hit by the global liquidity 
crisis. Regarding the outward FDI from Russia, the amount has remained relatively stable – $ 
45.9 billion in 2007, $ 56 billion in 2008, and $ 46 billion in 2009, that is respectively 16.8%, 
15.2% and 17.4% of GFCF. The statics on outward FDI should be considered with caution. It 
represents only approximation to the real activity of Russian multinational companies. It 
might be argued that a certain part of these investments relate to ‘capital flight’ rather than 
genuine investment projects abroad. In terms of FDI stocks, 2009 showed some increase in 
the amount of accumulated inward and outward FDI stocks, compare to 2008, however, the 
level of 2007 was never achieved.  
Russian companies became less engaged in cross-border M&As, both sales and purchases. In 
2009, cross-border M&A, purchases, i.e. acquisitions of foreign assets by Russian residents 
constituted the amount of $ 7.6 billion, in contrast to $ 18.5 billion in 2007. Likewise, the 
value of sales dropped to $ 5 billion in 2009 in contrast to $ 22.5 billion in 2007. 
 
Table 1 Russia’s FDI and cross-border M&A statistics, 2007-2009 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 
FDI flows    
Inward FDI flows, mln $ 55 073 75 461 38 722 
Inward FDI flows, percentage of GFCF 20.2 20.4 14.7 
Outward FDI flows, mln $ 45 916 56 091 46 057 
Outward FDI flows, percentage of GFCF 16.8 15.2 17.4 
FDI stocks    
Inward FDI stocks, mln $ 491 232 213 734 252 456 
Outward FDI stocks, mln $ 370 161 202 837 248 894 
Inward FDI stocks, percentage of GDP 38.2 12.7 20.3 
Outward FDI stocks, percentage of GDP 28.8 12.1 20.1 
Cross-border M&A    
Cross-border M&A, sales (net), mln $ 22 529 13 507 5 079 
Cross-border M&A, purchases (net), mln $ 18 598 16 634 7 599 
Source: UNCTAD, 2010 
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3.2. Policy responses 
The Russian government reacted vigorously to the crisis. The principal objectives of the 
government’s anti-crisis programme were to maintain the banking sector’s financial liquidity, 
stimulate internal demand, alleviate the negative impacts on society and support the key 
domestic enterprises. More specifically, antirecessionary measures of the Russian government 
could be provisionally divided into the following categories: (1) expansion of access to 
financial resources for business companies; (2) provision of incentives to expand domestic 
demand; (3) reduction in tax and administrative burdens on businesses; (4) support of small 
and medium-sized enterprises; and (5) development of the labour market (Gurvich et al, 
2010). 
At the end of 2008, the Russian government resolutely carried out a number of measures. 
Firstly, urgent financial help was provided to the largest Russian companies. This help was 
offered through the state corporation ‘Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs’, 
known in Russian as Vneshekonombank (VEB), an institution used by the Russian 
government to support and develop the Russian economy, to manage Russian state debts and 
pension funds. VEB granted loans to Russian borrowers for refinancing their foreign loans, 
with their assets based on the Russian territory as collateral. Between October 27 and 
December 1, 2008, nine large companies were supported by VEB, for a total amount of $9.78 
trillion.  
Secondly, tax burden on businesses was reduced. The corporate profit tax was lowered from 
24% to 20%; depreciation premiums for certain types of fixed assets were increased from 
10% to 30%; and the maximum level of interest rates was increased on liabilities recognised 
as costs. Besides, procedural changes were made in the calculation of certain taxes to alleviate 
a shortage of funds, e.g. companies were given the right to deduct VAT from advances. 
Thirdly, policy measures were taken to protect domestic markets, such as increases in customs 
duties on imports, and introduction of preferential prices for Russian suppliers of goods to 
state and municipal entities (Gurvich et al, 2010). 
Wiśniewska et al (2010) enlist several main characteristics of the anti-crisis policy conducted 
by the Russian government. The policy was characterised by the arbitrary selection of 
beneficiary sectors and enterprises, often based on political decisions and unclear criteria. A 
related point is the lack of transparency. Initially, the terms of foreign debt refinancing were 
defined quite precisely, i.e. state aid was to be offered only to those Russian companies or 
their foreign subsidiaries whose activities are of significant importance for the economies of 
the respective regions or strategic branches of industry. However, subsequently the procedure 
was made secret, and no official information was disclosed. As mentioned, strategic branches 
of industry were supported, meaning that the aid was extended to the traditional sectors of the 
economy, including the raw materials sector; the machine-building industry, especially the 
automotive industry; as well as agriculture, construction and air and rail transport. The aid 
was directed towards big businesses (that received more than 60% of total assistance), while 
small businesses received only around 5% of total public aid. 
The policy was of compensatory nature, i.e. the measures undertaken were aimed at 
mitigating losses, and the current situation was conserved, and no instruments were 
implemented to motivate companies to pursue more active policies, diversify production or 
seek new markets. That was the non-conditionality principle of the policy – the government 
set practically no requirements for the aid beneficiaries. Overall, the design of the policy was 
rushed by the pressure of time, and powerful lobbying by various interest groups. And last but 
not least, a typically Russian characteristics can be applied to this specific policy too – 
ineffective implementation of approved normative acts (Wiśniewska et al, 2010). 
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Despite all possible inefficiencies of the anti-crisis policy measures, they managed to largely 
contain and neutralise the most adverse crisis manifestations of the crisis have been largely 
contained and neutralised.  
 
4. Impact of the global financial crisis on emerging Russian multinationals 
In this section I examine various facets of Russian companies’ response to the crisis. I start 
with an exploration of Russian companies’ financial performance. This statistics will provide 
background to the analysis of foreign acquisitions and foreign divestments. This quantitative 
analysis is further supported by qualitative analysis of several cases across various industries. 
Analysis of Russian initial public offerings (IPO) abroad will follow. 
 
4.1. Financial performance  
In order to provide context to the analysis of foreign acquisitions and divestments, this section 
gives insights into financial performance of major Russian companies, relying on a study by 
the German agency Handelsblatt Research (Table 2). The study reports financial performance 
of the 500 largest European companies. The global economic slowdown is shown evidently, 
as in 2009 the revenues of these 500 companies fell by 9.6% on average; and their net profit 
declined by 26%, in comparison to 2008. 
This rating of 500 largest European companies includes some 30 Russian companies. 
Virtually all of these companies are multinationals as they have distinctive presence abroad, 
with the minor exception of power generating company Mosenergo, retail chain Magnit, etc. 
Therefore, the list is a good indication of financial performance of Russian multinationals in 
2009. Similar to their Western counterparts, most resource-based companies (in the oil and 
gas, steel and minerals sectors) sustained decline in the revenue in 2009. However, they 
managed to maintain a high, double-digit, level of profitability. While Russia’s largest 
company Gazprom suffered a decline of 18.2% in its revenue in 2009, its profitability stood at 
the 26.1%. Overall, the profitability of Russian companies on average constituted 13.7% 
(Handelsblatt Research, 2010). Most German companies in the rating even before the crisis 
reached only half of this amount. Gazprom, Surgutneftegaz, Transneft, Norilsk Nickel and 
Roshydro reported profitability of over 25%, the highest among other companies in the rating. 
At the same time, companies in steel industry (Severstal, Evraz, TMK) and automotive sector 
(AvtoVAZ and GAZ Auto) have been adversely hit by the crisis, and posted negative net 
profit and negative profitability. 
Competitive advantages allowing Russian companies to occupy positions in ratings of the 
leading European companies are multifaceted. On the domestic market they include, inter alia, 
natural resource base, low energy prices, dominant (quasi-monopolistic) market positions, low 
labour costs, and last but not least, strong governmental support and aid. These factors suggest 
that major Russian multinational companies were in state to advance their expansion into 
foreign markets in the crisis period. 
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Table 2 Russian companies in the rating of the top 500 largest European companies, 2009 
Rat
ing Company Sector 
Revenue Net profit Profita
bility 
% € mln 
Change 
to 2008, 
% 
€ mln 
Change 
to 2008, 
% 
12 Gazprom Oil and gas 67 806 -18,2 17 673 1,0 26,1 
23 Lukoil Oil and gas 49 654 -2,4 5 118 -5,0 10,3 
57 Rosneft Oil Oil and gas 25 325 -8,5 4 755 -27,4 18,8 
61 TNK-BP Oil and gas 24 124 -9,3 3 452 -8,2 14,3 
106 Gazpromneft Oil and gas 14 758 -33,9 2 199 -31,8 14,9 
114 Surgutneftegaz Oil and gas 13 584 -21,1 3 451 48,8 25,4 
118 Sistema Telecom 13 015 12,8 1 141 >100 8,8 
164 Severstal Steel 9 529 -27,8 -757 - -7,9 
168 IDGC Supplier 9 299 3,7 260 22,8 2,8 
177 Tatneft Oil and gas 8 629 -17,5 1 233 >100 14,3 
197 MMC Norilsk Nickel Minerals 7 302 -23,6 1 906 - 26,1 
203 MTS Telecom 7 064 17,0 722 -36,5 10,2 
210 Evraz Steel 6 783 -43,5 -868 - -12,8 
224 Transneft Oil and gas 6 478 4,7 1 661 -0,9 25,6 
227 X 5 Retail Retail 6 363 29,3 121 - 1,9 
228 Vimpelcom Telecom 6 353 6,6 803 >100 12,6 
245 Rusal Minerals 5 871 -36,5 590 - 10,1 
284 AvtoVAZ Automotive 4 525 -13,4 -574 - -12,7 
288 Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK) Steel 4 482 -35,0 157 -88,3 3,5 
306 Mechel Steel 4 138 -29,4 53 -92,1 1,3 
312 GAZ Auto Automotive 4 015 -5,7 -225 - -5,6 
317 Magnit Retail 3 908 24,1 201 81,7 5,1 
327 Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Steel 3 709 -40,3 169 -73,3 4,6 
394 Bashneft Oil and gas 2 872 1,9 256 -30,0 8,9 
416 Aeroflot Airlines 2 718 0,6 33 -84,7 1,2 
431 Rushydro Power generation 2 621 3,3 695 - 26,5 
441 Mosenergo Power generation 2 590 15,9 38 -21,3 1,5 
457 Salavatnefteorgsintez Chemicals 2 471 -8,6 135 22,0 5,4 
461 Slavneft Oil and gas 2 460 -8,6 219 -43,1 8,9 
474 TMK Steel 2 402 -28,3 -225 - -9,4 
Source: Handelsblatt Research, 2010 
 
4.2. Foreign acquisitions 
The section uses the data provided by Zephyr database (managed by Bureau van Dijk), one of 
the most comprehensive and authoritative databases on deal information, containing data on 
IPO, private equity and venture capital deals. The period between 01/01/2000 and 01/01/2011 
is defined for analysis, to show a more long-term trend of internationalisation, with particular 
attention to the crisis stage of 2008-2011. In total, 18 026 completed M&A and joint venture 
deals are recorded for the whole period. Apart from international acquisitions, they include 
intra-Russian deals, management buy-out deals, deals where bidders are undisclosed, an 
acquirer is a governmental entity or a physical person. A prime example of such deal would 
be acquisition of the UK-based Chelsea Football Club Ltd by the Russian national Mr Roman 
Abramovich in 2003. More recently, in April 2010, an unnamed Russian individual acquired 
the 100% stake in the Spanish manufacturer of jewellery Carrera y Carrera S.A. for an 
unidentified amount. 
After removing these entries, as well as 146 joint venture deals, I obtain 770 deals. These are 
acquisitions by Russian companies of stakes in foreign companies (minority stakes, increases 
in stakes, majority stakes and 100% acquisitions). ‘A Russian company’ is defined as a legal 
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entity registered / incorporated on the Russian territory under the Russian jurisdiction; it 
ranges from SMEs to well-established Russian multinationals. On the side of acquisition 
targets, it should be noted that although technically these deals involve acquisition of foreign 
(non-Russian) companies, these entities are not always ‘foreign’ per se. These can be firms 
established according to the host country’s regulations and jurisdiction but either partially-
owned or controlled by Russian firms or individuals.  
Cyprus is very popular among Russian businesses thanks to its highly developed financial 
infrastructure and legislation facilitating tax optimisation and offshore business operations. In 
Cyprus, for example, affiliates of the shareholders of the oil and gas company Itera, Norilsk 
Nickel, Rostelekom, the railway operator Globaltrans, automaker KamAZ, electric company 
TGK-4, investment company Troika Dialog and others are registered. Many Russian brokers 
carry out operations on the Russian stock market through their Cypriote offices. The Russian 
Federal Financial Markets Service, the Russian financial regulator, had always intended to 
stop or at least minimise this practice. The global economic crisis acted as a trigger, and in 
November 2008, the Russian regulator signed a memorandum of mutual understanding with 
the Commission on Securities and Stock Operations of Cyprus. The agreement created a base 
to ensure transparent regulation of financial institutes, as the Russian Federal Financial 
Markets Service seeks to obtain information on real ownership of Russian companies 
registered in Cyprus (Kommersant, 2008).  
In the following analysis, the number of deals is used, not their amounts, as the values are not 
readily available for all deals, hence it would hinder comparative analysis. As the data shows 
(Table 3), since 2000, Russian companies have been increasingly involved in foreign 
acquisitions. The amount of these deals had been steadily rising – from just 16 in 2000 to 119 
in 2008. In fact, the year 2008 became a turning point. The amount decreased slightly in 2009, 
and even further fell in 2010, to 70 deals, the level of 2005.  
 
Table 3 Number of acquisition deals by Russian companies, 2000-2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 16 28 35 53 60 70 103 114 119 102 70 
CIS 6 10 16 25 34 30 35 29 32 35 28 
EU 8 12 17 18 17 28 41 50 56 44 31 
Non-EU Europe  3  4  2 7 3 5 6 1 
Northern America 2 3  1 2 2 5 10 11 9 5 
Africa   1 1 4 1  1 4   
Latin America     1  1   4 1 
Asia and Australia   1 3 1 5 3 5 8  2 
Offshores    1 1 2 10 9 3 2 1 
Unidentified     1  1 7  2 1 
Source: Zephyr database 
 
The geography of Russian corporate expansion is diverse. Russian companies feel at ease in 
their traditional markets – former Soviet republics, now the members of the CIS. Within this 
grouping, the major share belongs to Ukraine, followed by Kazakhstan and Belarus, 
traditional Russia’s trading partners. In parallel, Russian companies expand their presence in 
the European Union. Within the EU, the lion’s share is taken by Cyprus due to the 
aforementioned reasons. Other leaders in the EU are The Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Germany 
and France in Western Europe, and Romania, Latvia and Czech Republic in Eastern Europe. 
Among non-EU European countries, Switzerland is the prime target for Russian acquisitions.  
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The Northern American market, consisting of USA and Canada, represents another attractive 
destination for Russian companies for a variety of motives and reasons. Further, It is notable 
that Russian companies acquire legal entities in a number of offshore locations, such as 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, etc. Companies acquired in offshore 
locations and Cyprus may serve as subsidiaries of Russian multinationals, and assets 
elsewhere might be bought through them later on. 
According to the data, the number of acquisition deals decreased in the crisis years of 2008-
2010, from 119 in 2008 to 70 in 2010. Yet, the expansion did not stop. In total, 291 deals are 
recorded in 2008-2010 (Table 4). The analysis shows a great variety of deals. Companies, 
operating in various industries, from mining, oil and gas to telecommunications, 
biotechnologies and banking, were involved in the deals. Likewise, acquirers themselves 
represent a very heterogeneous group. They range from medium-sized regional enterprises 
with limited foreign presence, to ‘real’ multinationals like Gazprom, TNK-BP, VTB Bank, 
etc. Besides, various holding companies and investment funds are active in foreign 
acquisitions. Such diversity though is not an inherent characteristic of the crisis period alone. 
Similarly, it was present the entire 2000s period. 
It can be seen that despite the crisis, Russian companies continued their foreign expansion, 
driven by a number of motives, such as resource-, market-, efficiency- and asset-seeking. 
Russian companies have been acquiring infrastructural assets (gas distribution networks, 
electricity transmission and energy generation) in the CIS and Eastern Europe. Manufacturing 
assets have been purchased on almost all continents. Moreover, Russian financial institutions 
have strengthened their positions; banks acquired stakes in foreign financial institutions and 
Russian stock exchanges RTS and MICEX extended its control over financial infrastructure in 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
Russian companies continue seeking advanced technology in the west, particularly in Western 
Europe. In many cases, they acquire a 100% ownership of medium-sized technology-intensive 
manufacturing companies. In certain instances, complete acquisition is not seen as necessary; 
as even a minority stake may provide access to superior know-how. An example is the Human 
Stem Cell Institute, a Russian biotechnology company; amidst the crisis, in August 2009, it 
acquired a minority stake of 25.01% in Germany’s developer of treatments for cancer 
Symbiotec GmbH for € 1 million. The intention is to learn from Symbiotec’s expertise and 
knowledge. 
On the other hand, some Russian companies used the opportunities offered by the crisis to 
increase their stake in their foreign assets. In November 2010, the Russian railway equipment 
manufacturer MTZ Transmash increased its stake in the engine manufacturer Wartsila TMH 
Diesel Engine, based in The Netherlands, from 50% to 100%. In July 2008, the Russian 
mobile telecommunication provider MTS increased its minority stake of 10% in the Dutch 
holding company Cezanne BV to 75%.  
The crisis should have led to decreased liquidity and forced companies to be cautions 
regarding their foreign investments. Nonetheless, some companies continued foreign 
expansion, and even acquired non-core assets. For example, in December 2008, Russia’s 
North West Oil Group Inc. acquired a 100% stake in Spain’s Hotel Los Monteros sl. for € 115 
million. Similarly, in May 2010, the Russian private equity investment company services 
Onexim Group bought an 80% stake in the US professional basketball team operator New 
Jersey Nets, for € 158.3 million. 
Last but not least, the influence of the Russian government has strengthened. The state-owned 
investment vehicle VEB bank has become a distinctive actor on foreign markets in the crisis 
years, specifically in the CIS markets, both directly and indirectly. 
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Table 4 Summary of acquisition deals by Russian companies in the years 2008-2010 
Country / 
Region 
No Main industries Acquirers – Russian multinationals 
CIS 95   
Armenia 6 Electricity transmission, gas distribution, 
banking 
Gazprom, Rosneftegaz, Gazprombank, 
Russian Railways 
Azerbaijan 2 Banking, brewery VTB Bank, Baltika 
Belarus 18 Banking, insurance, oil and gas, 
telecommunications  
Gazprom, Svyaznoy, VEB Bank, 
Sberbank, RESO group 
Georgia 4 Banking VTB Bank 
Kazakhstan 21 Banking and finances, uranium mining 
telecommunications, electric 
manufacturing, pipe manufacturing, food 
and beverages 
RTS Stock exchange, VTB Bank, 
Severstal, TMK, PIK Group, Beeline, 
Sibirskii Bereg 
Moldova 1 Energy (hydroelectric power plant) InterRAO EES 
Ukraine 42 Banking, insurance and investments, oil 
and gas, food and beverages, steel / metal 
manufacturing, R&D, aircraft / spacecraft, 
pharmaceuticals 
Bank of Moscow, Alfa-Bank, VEB, 
Bank Petrokommerts, MICEX and 
RTS,  Troika Investment, TNK-BP, 
Gazprom, VSMPO, Sibirskii Bereg 
Uzbekistan 1 Pump-power equipment manufacturing Uralelektrotyazhmash-Uralgidromash 
EU 131   
Austria 6 Hotels, machinery, oil and gas, 
Avionics, agricultural, chemical and motor 
vehicle parts manufacturing 
Azimut Hotels, Sibur Holding, Lukoil, 
Traktornye Zavody 
Belgium 4 Iron and steel manufacturing, retail Boston NV, Severstal, Magnitogorsk 
Metallurgy Combinat 
Cyprus 41 Asset management, investment services, 
auditing, mobile telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals, coal and iron ore mining, 
construction management 
KAMAZ, Sberbank, mechel, MTS, 
UFG Asset Management, 
Gazprombank, PIK Group, MMK, 
InterRAO EES, Farmstandart, Uralsib 
Czech 
Republic 
6 Aircraft manufacturing, water turbines 
manufacturing, engineering 
OMZ, UGMK, Tyazhmash 
Denmark 4 Car and machinery manufacturing AvtoVAZ, Agromashholding 
Estonia 3 Banking, chemical manufacturing Bank of Moscow, Acron 
Finland 4 Banking, machinery manufacturing Onexim Group, VTB Bank 
France 4 Locomotive part manufacturing, chemical 
manufacturing, alcoholic beverages 
SVL group, Uralvagonzavod, Uralkhim 
Germany 8 Chemical and nuclear technology, 
chemical manufacturing, timber products 
manufacturing, gas distribution, 
biotechnology 
Gazprom, Ilim Timber Industry, 
Atomstroieksport, Concern Traktornye 
Zavody 
Hungary 2 Oil and gas production, airlines Surgutneftegaz, VEB Bank 
Ireland 1 Oil and gas exploration and production Centrofervel Ltd 
Italy 8 Steel manufacturing, machinery 
manufacturing, oil and gas refining 
Severstal, Gazprom Neft, Sibirskii 
Agrarnyi Holding, Kosmos Association 
Latvia 3 Pharmaceuticals, steel manufacturing, 
ceramic tile manufacturing 
Severstal, Farmstandart, SU-155 Group 
Netherlands 18 Engine manufacturing, mobile 
telecommunications, petroleum refining, 
investment holding, investment services 
MTZ Transmash, Mechel, Lukoil, 
Baring Vostok Capital, MTS, 
St.Petersburg Sea Port 
Portugal 1 Banking and investment VTB Bank 
Romania 4 Steel and metal manufacturing, software Lyuksoft, Mechel, Severstal 
Slovakia 2 Freight transportation, refractory materials 
manufacturing 
Transkonteiner, Combinat Magnezit 
Spain 2 Ventilation equipment, hotels Interskol, North-Western Oil Group 
United 
Kingdom 
10 Mineral, oil and gas exploration and 
production, telecommunications, 
financials, ISP, gold mining 
Gazprom Neft, Mechel, Millhouse, 
Renaissance Capital, Comstar 
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Table 4 (cont.) Summary of acquisition deals by Russian companies in the years 2008-2010 
Non-EU 
Europe 
12   
Montenegro 2 Oil and gas, hotels Lukoil, Korston Group 
Norway 1 Banking Turris 
Serbia 3 Banking, bus manufacturing Gazprom Neft, Tehnika Servis 
Switzerland 6 Logistics, locomotive manufacturing, 
pumps and compressors manufacturing, 
banking services 
Mechel, Gazprombank, Renova 
Northern America 25   
USA 22 Oil and gas, steel manufacturing, 
computer and software, land and sea 
launch services 
Energia Overseas, Onexim 
Group,Severstal, Gazprom Neft, 
Investment company Troika, Mechel, 
Almaz Capital, Severstal, TMK 
Canada 3 Potassium mining services, gold 
exploration, residential building 
construction 
Severstal, Akron, Growth Technologies 
Asia 10   
Israel 2 Engineering, internet technologies Yandex, IST Group 
Cambodia, China, 
Hong Kong, India, 
Mongolia, Taiwan 
8 Mobile telecommunication services, 
railways operator, computer 
manufacturing, cathode blocks 
manufacturing, turbine 
manufacturing 
United Company Russian Aluminium, 
Novorossiysk Sea Trade Port, Sistema, 
Silovye Machiny, Vympel (Beeline), 
Russian Railways, Rover Computers 
Latin America 5   
Brazil, Colombia, 
Panama, Peru 
5 Helicopter transport services, 
mechanical engineering, electric 
machinery, equipment for power 
stations 
Airline YutAir, Tyazhmash, Silovye 
Mashiny 
Africa 4   
Ghana, Seychelles, 
South Africa, 
Zambia 
4 Building materials, securities 
brokerage 
Renaissance Capital, Brikor Ltd 
Offshores 6   
Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands, 
Marshall Islands 
6 Investment banking services, offshore 
lifeboat vessels construction services 
Onexim Group, Bashneft,Vympel 
(Beeline) 
Other 3   
Country unknown 3 Investment services, 
telecommunications 
Nafta Moskva, Megafon, Investment 
Company Finam 
Source: compiled by author based on Zephyr database (Bureau van Dijk) 
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4.3. Foreign divestments 
It expected that the global crisis have had a moderating effect on expansion abroad. In 
additional to putting their expansion plans on halt, companies may even divest, to dispose of 
their assets abroad. While a company may divest its assets at home, I intentionally analyse 
only divestments abroad in order to analyse the effect of the crisis on foreign activities of 
Russian multinationals. The Zephyr database is used to track all deals in which a Russian 
company (not an individual or a governmental body) acted as a vendor, and a target was 
located elsewhere than Russia. For the period of 2008-2010 only 27 entries meeting these 
criteria are retrieved – 6 deals in 2008, 13 in 2009 and 8 in 2010 (Table 5).  
Two main regions of these deals are the CIS and the EU. In the CIS, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
were countries of most targets; and in fact it reflects the geography of acquisitions by Russian 
companies. In the EU, Latvia, Estonia and Austria can be highlighted. Deals with offshore 
companies were recorded too. Two prime examples are here. Firstly, in January 2009, Roman 
Abramovich’s asset management fund Millhouse LLC sold the 31.25% stake in Primerod 
International Ltd based in British Virgin Islands to another entity registered in the same 
country. In December 2010, Gazprom sold its investment holding ZGG Cayman Holding 
registered in Cayman Islands for € 2 billion, by doing so, it effectively sold its 9.4% stake in 
the Russian gas producer Novatek. Novatek is the largest independent natural gas producer, 
and second-largest in Russia overall after Gazprom. 
Regarding the sectoral composition, there was a great variety – oil and gas, uranium mining, 
perfumes and cosmetics retail, food and beverages production, banking and insurance 
services, etc. 
As the data show, several Russian companies sold minority stakes, stakes in non-core assets, 
etc. Mirax Group, one of the leading Russian construction services companies, involved in the 
construction of the business district Moscow-City, faced with liquidity problems and had to 
sell a 100% stake in a hotel in Turkey for €190 million in February 2010.  Another company, 
the cosmetics retailer Arbat Prestizh had to sell its foreign assets as it had gone bankrupt, on 
grounds unrelated to the global economic crisis. Its top management faced tax fraud charges 
in 2008, and the company ceased to exist in 2010.  
Some deals seeming as pure divestments represented corporate consolidation. In August 2010, 
the Russian beer manufacturer Baltika Breweries sold 100% of its wholly owned Kazakhstani 
subsidiary Baltika-Almata for an undisclosed amount. This deal in fact represented integration 
of companies within the Carlsberg Group (the owner of Baltika). This deal completed the 
process of the integration of Baltika Breweries and Derbes Breweries within the Carlsberg 
Group on the territory of Kazakhstan. Likewise, the sale of a stake in Kazakhstan’s Karatau 
uranium mine by Atomredmetzoloto in December 2009 represented an organisational and 
corporate restructuring. 
Overall, no general trend can be recorder and an overall conclusion derived. It might well be 
that many of these deals would have occurred in any case, even in a non-crisis period. 
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Table 5 Divestment deals by Russian companies in 2008-2010 
Date Vendor Industry Target Country of 
target 
Country of 
acquirer 
Stake, 
% 
Value, € 000 
2008        
17-10-2008 Arbat Prestizh Perfumes and cosmetics 
retailer 
Arbat Prestizh’s 31 perfume and 
cosmetics stores in Ukraine 
Ukraine Ukraine 100 n.a. 
31-07-2008 N-Trans Sea port operator Vopak EOS AS Estonia The Netherlands 15 n.a. 
30-06-2008 Paterson-Invest Land and supermarket 
estate operation services 
Paterson’s 3 Kiev-based 
supermarkets 
Ukraine Ukraine 100 n.a. 
21-05-2008 Lukoil Oil and gas Lukoil’ 54 gas stations in Poland Poland Poland 100 n.a. 
05-05-2008 Gazprom Media Media services Mediatopprim Ltd Moldova USA 100 n.a. 
15-04-2008 Nakhodka Re Reinsurance services Pasifik Oushen SK Ukraine USA 100 634.20 
2009        
28-12-2009 TMK Metallurgy NS Group Inc. USA USA 51 n.a. 
15-12-2009 Atomredmetzoloto Uranium mining services The Karatau Uranium Mine Kazakhstan The Netherlands 50 301 050.03 
11-12-2009 Stock Exchange RTS Stock exchange Ukrainian Stock Exchange Ukraine Ukraine 9 n.a. 
06-11-2009 Rolf GK Car dealer FF Sheffe BV The 
Netherlands 
Japan 40 48 408.31 
 
06-11-2009 Bryansk Machine-
building factory 
Machinery manufacturer Luganskteplovoz Holding Company Ukraine Ukraine 76 n.a. 
28-10-2009 AvtoVAZ Car manufacturer Delta Motor Group OY Finland UK n.a. n.a. 
12-08-2009 Managing company 
Estar 
Steel manufacturer 
holding company 
Donetsk electrometallurgy factory Ukraine Ukraine 100 706 800.00 
11-08-2009 Gidromashservis Electric engine 
manufacturer 
NPO Gidromash Ukraine Ukraine 99.53 n.a. 
07-05-2009 Antanta PIO Global 
Investment Group 
Investment holding 
company 
PIO Hlobal Ukrayina, Asset 
Management Company 
Ukraine Ukraine 100 n.a. 
30-04-2009 Basic Element Asset investment 
management holding 
Strabag SE Austria Austria 25 493 620.00 
20-03-2009 Nutritek Baby food, diary food 
producer 
Agro PIIM AS Estonia Estonia 100 n.a. 
29-01-2009 Veritas SPA Multi-utility services Veritas Energia SRL Italy Italy 51 1 300.00 
13-01-2009 Millhouse LLC Asset management Primerod International Ltd British Virgin 
Islands 
British Virgin 
Islands 
31.25 n.a. 
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Table 5 (Cont.) Divestment deals by Russian companies in 2008-2010 
2010        
20-12-2010 Gazprom Oil and gas ZGG Cayman Holding Cayman 
Islands 
Ireland 100 2 146 080.65 
29-10-2010 Farmstandart Medical manufacturing / 
pharmaceuticals 
Grindeks AS Latvia Latvia 11.381 9 840 64 
06-08-2010 Baltika Beer manufacturer Baltika-Almata Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 100 n.a. 
08-07-2010 Petrovsky Bank Banking services IEFK Banka AD Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
99 6 544.54 
12-05-2010 Ingosstrakh Insurance services Garant Versicherungs-AG Austria Belgium 33 n.a. 
18-03-2010 Russian Alcohol Group Alcohol manufacturer Ushba Distillery Georgia Georgia 100 3 640.28 
24-02-2010 Mirax Group Construction services Sungate Port Royal De Luxe Resort 
Hotel 
Turkey Turkey 100 190 000.00 
19-02-2010 Kavitatsionnye 
Tekhnologii 
Financial leasing services Dnepropetrovsk factory for repair 
and building of passenger rail 
wagons ‘Dneprovagonremstroy’ 
Ukraine Ukraine 96.12 n.a. 
Source: compiled by author based on Zephyr database (Bureau van Dijk) 
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4.4. Sectoral analysis and cases 
Previous sub-sections outlined the overall picture of Russian companies’ foreign acquisitions 
and divestments. While there are generic responses of the emerging Russian multinationals to 
the global crisis, sectoral idiosyncrasies are strongly pronounced too. I further analyse sectoral 
differences more in-depth, using relevant examples, with a focus on their expansion or 
contraction abroad. Table 6 briefly summarises key deals discussed in this section. 
 
Table 6 Overview of deals concluded in the crisis period, 2008-2010 
Industry Russian company Expansion Contraction 
Oil and gas Lukoil TRN (Netherlands)  
Steel Severstal Lucchini (Italy) & Crew Gold (UK)  
Metallurgy Mechel Bluestone (USA)  
Automotive Basic Element  Magna Int. (Canada) 
Construction Basic Element  Hochtief (Germany) 
Construction Basic Element Strabag (Austria) Strabag (Austria) 
Engineering Renova Oerlikon (Switzerland) & Sulzer 
(Switzerland) 
 
Financials VEB Prominvestbank (Ukraine) & 
Belvnesheconombank (Belarus) 
 
Internet DST ICQ & Facebook (USA)  
 
Oil and gas companies 
Initially, the oil and gas sector was hardest hit by the crisis (leading to the substantial fall of 
energy prices). However, the policy measures undertaken by the Russian government helped 
mitigate the adverse effect of the crisis. Firstly, Russian oil companies earned considerable 
amounts as a result of the national currency devaluation (since most contracts were nominated 
in foreign currencies). Additionally, anti-crisis policy measures in the form of tax breaks 
added billions of profit. It can be said that the negative effects of the crisis for the Russian oil 
and gas companies ceased to exist at the beginning of 2009, and it is mainly due to the rise of 
oil prices. A recent report by Moody’s Investor Services confirms that the financial robustness 
of the Russian oil and gas companies during the economic downturn was sustained by the 
policy measures such as the devaluation of the Russian national currency and changes in the 
tax system. Besides, cost cutting actions and access to funding boosted the companies’ 
resilience to the problems (Moody’s, 2010). The agency’s forecast for the Russian oil and gas 
companies is positive; and Moody’s overall outlook for the sector is stable due to the rising 
demand for oil and gas globally. 
Boosted by the rising revenues, Russian oil and gas multinationals have continued their 
foreign expansion. On 1 September 2009, Russian private oil company Lukoil completed the 
purchase of Dow Chemicals’ 45% stake in the Dutch refinery Total Raffinaderij Nederland 
(TRN). The value of the deal, excluding crude oil and products inventory, was $600 million, 
in line with an agreement reached between Lukoil and Total in June 2008. TRN is located in 
the Vlissingen Oost harbour area in the south-western part of the Netherlands. This is one of 
world’s largest oil and oil-product trading hubs (Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp) benefiting 
from access to the well-established infrastructure, including Maasvlakte Olie Terminal, in 
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which TRN owns a 22% share. Prior to the acquisition, Lukoil was already a major supplier to 
TRN from its Timan-Pechora fields. Lukoil’s press release emphasises that ‘these advantages 
enable Lukoil to strengthen its positions in North Western Europe and increase efficiency of 
its trading operations. The company will also be able to use TRN to supply and further 
develop its retail presence in Western Europe. The acquisition of a share in TRN represents 
another milestone in Lukoil’s strategy to acquire world-class refining assets located in direct 
proximity to end-user markets’ (Lukoil, 2009). 
The stake became available for purchase because Dow Chemicals was acting under pressure 
to sell assets quickly and cut costs and manpower in order to repay debts in the US. On the 
other hand, Lukoil reported a net cash reserve of $3.2 billion at that time, resources available 
to finance acquisitions abroad. The price paid by Lukoil for the 45% stake is a deeply 
discounted valuation, due to the global economic downturn; therefore Lukoil acquired this 
asset on the cheap, an opportunity created by the crisis (Socor, 2009). In fact, this is not the 
first Lukoil’s acquisition in Europe. Several years ago Lukoil had embarked on a strategy to 
acquire stakes in refineries and retail marketing networks in the European Union. It acquired 
refineries in Bulgaria and Romania prior to accession of these countries into the European 
Union. However attempts to buy assets in other countries (UK, Germany, Spain, Lithuania, 
the Czech Republic) were unsuccessful. The assets were too expensive to acquire. As the 
global oil prices started to fall in the second half of 2008, assets lost in value too. At this 
moment Lukoil realised its first major acquisition in Western Europe. It bought a 49% stake, 
with an option to expand it later, in the Italian ERG group’s ISAB refinery in Sicily. 
 
Steel industry 
Russian steel industry is dependent both on foreign markets and domestic construction and 
automobile industries. The first sign of the crisis in the sector were reported at the end of 
September 2008. Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works laid off large numbers of its workers 
and reduced output. Likewise, drops in production (both at home and overseas) and layoffs 
(or decreases in wages) were reported for Severstal and Evraz Group. Overall, substantial 
decline in production and output in raw material industries; automobile and tool-making 
industries was recorded in Russia; and hence prices on aluminium and nickel plummeted to a 
break-even point. 
The industry appealed to the state aid and relied on the government funds through VTB loans 
in the framework of the anti-crisis policy measures. VTB issued a 10 billion roubles 
emergency loan to Evraz to finance its current tax payments; also, a 5 billion roubles loan was 
issued to TMK. In its investment report, Moody’s Investor Services forecasts slow recovery 
of domestic demand in Russia, which will continue to limit the growth prospects of Russian 
steel industry. While some signs of prospects are seen as the demand for steel increases 
globally, domestic demand is important for steel producers’ long-term stability and growth 
prospects (Moody’s, 2010). 
Despite this industry’s downfall, companies did not stop their international expansion. 
Severstal, a Russian steel manufacturer, has also been hit by the crisis, but returned to profit in 
the third quarter of 2009 thanks to a strong performance at its domestic mills. Even before 
that, it continued corporate consolidation. In November 2008 it acquired a 100% stake in 
Severstal Belgium Holding and increased its stake from 49.23% to 51.25% in Severstal US 
Holdings in December 2009. In March 2010, the company increased its stake in the Italian 
steel manufacturer Lucchini SpA, from 79.8% to 100%, paying some € 100 million. And in 
May 2010, it increased its stake in another foreign affiliate – Canada’s High River Gold 
Mines Ltd, from 50.1% to 68.86% having paid € 92.5 million. 
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Severstal first acquired a stake in Lucchini back in 2005. Lucchini has a network of domestic 
and international facilities, possesses a wide product range and the integral cycle technology. 
Following this original deal, Severstal acquired 79.8% and the Lucchini family retained a 
minority stake of 20.2%. As the crisis unfolded, Lucchini started posting negative earning. On 
one hand, the situation offered the Lucchini family to sell its remaining stake in the loss-
making company. On the other hand, Severstal acquired the stake for a lower prices (as it is 
speculated, Severstal paid € 100 million instead of € 160 million. Following the transaction 
Severstal now owns 100% of Lucchini SpA; however, as the company remains loss making 
and the prospects for Severstal on the European steel market are bleak, the Russian 
multinational is looking for a strategic buyer. 
Financial problems in another foreign company allowed Severstal to expand to West Africa. 
In February 2010, Severstal acquired, through its subsidiary Bluecone Ltd, ownership and 
control of 15.71% of shares in Crew Gold, a London-based gold mining company, holding 
major assets in Guinea, West Africa. This transaction effectively raised Severstal’s ownership 
to 19.79% (Severstal, 2010). This acquisition followed a corporate restructuring at Crew Gold 
in response to financial difficulties. In June 2010, Severstal became a control shareholder and, 
after acquiring a 43.21% stake from another shareholder, Endeavour Financial Corporation, 
Severstal became a 93.38% shareholder. The final step was done on 10 January 2011, when 
Nord Gold N.V., a Dutch subsidiary of Severstal acquired a remaining 6.62% stake in Crew 
Gold. Following this transaction Severstal has become a 100% shareholder (Severstal, 2011). 
 
Metallurgy 
The metallurgy faced problems similar to the steel industry as aforementioned. The Russian 
extraction and metallurgic concern Mechel represents a relevant case in point. At the 
beginning of the crisis, the majority of the company’s debt was current/short-term. To enable 
the company to continue operations, Mechel started restructuring of its debt into payable in 
the long-term. Several financing deals were concluded – 15 billion roubles (approximately 
$560 million) in December 2008 by VTB Bank, $1 billion in February 2009 by 
Gazprombank, refinancing of $2.6 billion in July 2009, and an agreement with VTB Bank to 
prolong its 15 billion roubles loan for another 3 years.  
It is at this adverse period, Mechel signed and closed an agreement and acquired a foreign 
company. On April 22, 2009, Mechel’s press-release reported an acquisition of 100% shares 
and interests of a number of U.S. entities, together ‘Bluestone’, privately-held West Virginia-
based coal businesses engaged in the mining, processing and sale of premium quality hard 
coking coal. The deal amount to $436 million paid in cash, approximately 83.3 million 
preferred shares, plus the assumption of approximately $132 million of net debt (Mechel, 
2009).  
Commenting on the deal, Mechel’s CEO emphasised the strategic nature of this acquisition, 
‘The addition of Bluestone’s production assets and large, high-quality coking coal reserves 
and resources establishes Mechel as one of the largest producers of coking coal in the world... 
Following the closing, we expect … a more diversified asset base, including a strong foothold 
in North America and enhanced European, American and Asian sales channels’ (Mechel, 
2009). In other words, Mechel expects to continue to serve Bluestone’s existing customer 
base, primarily in Northern America and Europe. 
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Automotive industry 
At the beginning of the crisis, the Russian automotive sector faced declining demand due to 
general uncertainty among consumers and a collapse in auto loan programmes. The sector had 
always enjoyed favourable conditions due to Russia’s high tariffs on imports in cars. As part 
of the anti-crisis measures, the government further increased these tariffs. 
GAZ and KAMAZ were the first auto makers to declare production cuts in September-
October 2008. The financial difficulties forced KAMAZ to request a state-backed loan and a 
private loan from Citigroup. KAMAZ was the target of acquisition by Daimler AG; and in 
December 2008 the deal was realised, as Daimler AG acquired the first 10% in KAMAZ 
stock. AvtoVAZ disclosed emergency measures on 16 October 2008. The company requested 
a government-backed interest-free loan of $ 1 billion through VTB. 
The Russian automotive industry can hardly boast the presence of Russian emerging 
multinationals. Russian automotive companies have only limited presence abroad. Therefore 
the crisis did not have a sizeable effect on foreign operations. However, some Russian 
multinationals had to sell shares in foreign automotive companies. The example of ‘Russkie 
Mashiny’ / Russian Machines, part of the Basic Element conglomerate, is illustrative. In May 
2007, Basic Element acquired 20% of shares in Canada’s Magna International, the second 
largest auto parts maker in North America, for $1.54 billion. The Russian company aimed to 
get access to the advanced Western technologies, and Magna International, in its turn, secured 
local partner in the fast-growing auto markets. Success, however, did not last long. The shares 
were used as collateral for a loan, and as stock prices of Basic Element plummeted in autumn 
2008, Magna’s shares were sold to the loan providers. 
Yet, the crisis offered an opportunity to buy foreign assets in the sector. The end of 2009 was 
marked by negotiations between GM, the parent company of German car manufacturer Opel 
and a consortium of the very same Magna International and Russian lender Sberbank. The 
intention of the consortium was to acquire a 55% stake in Opel (Sberbank – 35 %, Magna – 
20%). The offer contemplated a total equity investment by the consortium of € 500 million 
over time. The primary intention of the Russian side was access to technology and know-how 
rather than market. German Gref, Sberbank’s chief executive stated, ‘If the import of 
technologies does not take place, it will mean that (the deal) was just a waste of time’ 
(Reuters, 2009). On 4 November 2009, after months of painstaking negotiations, the Board of 
GM, the parent company of Opel, announced its intention to reject the deal and to implement 
a restructuring plan, keeping Opel within its corporate structure. It is speculated that the 
negative perception of the Russian government’s involvement in the deal was one of the 
reasons behind its failure. 
 
Construction 
In May 2007, the Basic Element Holding acquired a 10% stake in the German construction 
company Hochtief Aktiengesellschaft. On 9 October 2008, Oleg Deripaska, the Russian 
billionaire and Basic Element’s owner announced his decision to exit Hochtief due to the 
steep drop in its value following the decline in construction industry amidst the global crisis. 
The shares were transferred to Commerzbank that provided a loan for the original deal. In 
fact, this transaction took place less than a week after Deripaska’s decision to divest a big 
stake the Canadian car parts maker Magna Int.  
Right before the crisis, in April 2007, Basic Element acquired a 25% stake in the Austrian 
construction company Strabag SE, through a subsidiary company Rasperia Trading Ltd, for 
€ 1.05 billion. As the global crisis struck and the Basic Element Holding started facing 
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pressure in its construction projects and a lack of liquidity, it surrendered its 25% stake to the 
other two core shareholders in May 2009 to repay the loan taken for its original acquisition 
and to be able to fund to fund other activities in the wake of the global financial crisis.  
However, as the Russian company began to re-emerge from the crisis, it considered re-
purchasing Strabag. On 8 November 2010, Basic Element’s Rasperia Trading Ltd announced 
an agreement with Strabag’s two core shareholders to repurchase a 17 % stake in the company 
for € 373 million; and the transaction was completed on 30 November 2010. Furthermore, the 
members of the syndicate agreed to provide Rasperia with an extension of the call option for 
the remaining 8% until 15 July 2014. The initial option covered 25%, exactly as the stake 
acquired initially in 2007 (Strabag, 2010). 
 
Engineering and high-tech 
A good example in relation to engineering is acquisition of two Swiss engineering companies 
by the Renova Group, a large Russian conglomerate. Both investments are particularly 
important as they offer Russian multinational companies access to new technologies that may 
be used on the Russian market. 
By the crisis, the Renova Group had held 27.10% in shares and 4.10% in purchase positions 
of Swiss engineering company Sulzer AG. Sulzer's activities include machinery, equipment, 
surface technology and thermal turbo machinery. Amidst the crisis, on 27 March 2009, the 
Renova Group announced that it had increased its shareholding to 31.20%.  
Renova had already had a stake in Swiss company OC Oerlikon, the leader in the market of 
semiconductor and vacuum technologies, manufacturing of textile machinery and data storage 
technologies. Besides, the company develops innovation technologies in outer space 
exploration, solar energy, laser and nanotechnologies. In May 2008, Renova increased its 
stake to 39%, and in June 2010 it further tightened the grip by increasing its ownership up to 
46.11% stake following Oerlikon’s capital increase and acquisition of further shares in the 
Swiss company (Renova, 2010).  
 
Financial services 
The Russian financial sector was one of the first to suffer from the crisis. However, timely 
intervention by the Russian government could prevent escalation of the crisis in the financial 
sector, and consequently in other sectors of the national economy. The state-owned 
development bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) is one the main vehicles of the government’s 
policy. VEB itself can be regarded not only as a government-owned corporation (100% of its 
shared owned the Russian government), but also as a multinational company. VEB possesses 
a network of representation offices in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, USA, 
China, India and the Republic of South Africa. 
In January 2009, VEB purchased additional shares issued by Ukraine’s Prominvestbank. In 
September 2009, VEB paid a total of $ 500 million to increase its share in the bank’s charter 
capital to 93.84%. Prominvestbank is one of Ukraine’s leading financial institutions, with an 
extensive branch network across Ukraine; it plays a lead role in supporting the industrial 
sector of Ukraine and the development of the national economy. As the crisis began to unfold, 
the Ukrainian bank found itself on the verge of a default; and the acquisition deal offered a 
chance to successfully resolve its most acute problems and to conduct a structural 
reorganisation (VEB, 2009). VEB is the owner of the majority stake of Belvnesheconombank, 
based in the Republic of Belarus. In 2009, VEB increased Belvnesheconombank’s 
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capitalisation, which enabled it to build up the volumes of financing to ensure the exports of 
the Russian equipment and technologies to the Belarusian market (VEB, 2009). 
 
IT and media 
Russian IT, software and media companies have been expanding over the recent years. Digital 
Sky Technologies (DST), an investment firm based in Moscow, is one of the main players in 
this sector. The company is a major investor in the Russian, CIS and Eastern European 
internet markets. It owns stakes in various internet companies. In May 2009, DST bought a 
1.96% stake in the Facebook social media website for $ 200 million. On April 28, 2010, AOL 
and DST reached an agreement for DST to acquire ICQ instant messaging service for $ 187.5 
million. At the beginning of January 2011, DST announced its decision to further increase its 
stake in Facebook, up to 10%. In this deal Facebook raises $ 50 million from DST and $ 450 
million from Goldman Sachs. 
 
4.5. Going public: foreign IPO 
The Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), opened in 1992 at the start of the 
economic transition, is one of the largest universal stock exchanges in the Russian Federation 
and East Europe. Next to it, the Russian Trading System (RTS) is a stock market established 
in 1995 in Moscow, consolidating various regional trading floors into one exchange. In 
addition to floating on national stock exchanges, in the mid-1990s, first Russian companies 
began to issue stocks and bonds in IPO, and raise money through global depositary receipt 
(GDR) in the west; that can also be seen as a sign of internationalisation. The reasons can be 
different – some smaller companies seek capital to expand, other companies (particularly 
privately-owned) look to become publicly traded to facilitate acquisitions, diversify their 
equity base and enhance prestige and exposure. 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) is one of the favourite global stock exchanges among 
Russian companies. As of 30 November 2010, some 2 676 companies are floating on LSE, 
with a total capitalisation of £ 3.8 trillion. Out of them, there are none from Brazil, 5 from 
China and 31 from Russian and India each. Performance of Indian companies can be 
explained by their cultural and historical proximity to the UK. As for Russia, this number 
does not in fact include Russian companies incorporated abroad. X5 Retail Group N.V, a food 
and drug retailer, operating in Russia but incorporated in The Netherlands, is floating on LSE 
since 11 May 2005. Likewise, Evraz Group, one of the world’s biggest vertically integrated 
steel production and mining businesses, with operations mainly in Russia, is registered in 
Luxembourg. It started floating on LSE in June 2005 as a Luxembourgian company. 
Gazprom was the first to be listed on LSE, on 28 October 1996. It was shortly followed by 
other large oil and gas producers – Tatneft (13 December 1996) and Lukoil (7 May 1997). 
The next Russian company (OMZ JSC) was listed on LSE at the end of 2003. Since then, 
IPOs by Russian companies on LSE became a clear rising trend – 3 in 2005, 8 in 2006, and 
the last pre-crisis year (2007) witnessed 10 IPOs. All these companies operate in various 
sectors – from oil and gas, and mining, to banks and biotechnology. 
As the crisis had hit, the number of IPOs by Russian companies plummeted. Only two 
Russian (private) companies became listed on LSE in 2008 – the food and drug retailer 
Magnit in April and the chemicals producer Acron in August. Acron, in fact, has postponed a 
float, opting instead for a placement of GDR. In 2009, at the peak of the crisis, only one 
Russian company proceeded with IPO. It is Rushydro, the world’s second-largest 
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hydroelectric power producer, and is Russia’s largest power-generating company and the 
largest successor to RAO UES, a former Russian electricity monopoly. Rushydro is partly 
government-owned (the Russian government has a stake of 58%). 
The year 2010 may be regarded a turning point. Three Russian companies (O’KEY, Mail.ru 
and TransContainer) became listed on LSE, all in November. These companies differ in terms 
of ownership and sectors. O’KEY Group is one of the largest retail chains in Russia. The 
funds raised on LSE will be used in part to finance the further expansion of the Group’s 
hypermarket and supermarket footprint in Russia over the next several years. The next 
company is Mail.Ru Group, the largest Internet company in the Russian-speaking world and 
the leading Internet company in Russia, based on global monthly unique users. It operates 
Russia’s leading e-mail service, the two largest Instant Messenger networks in Russia and 
Russian-language online social networking sites. Last but not least, TransContainer is an 
intermodal transport company based in Russia, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned 
railway company. 
Although LSE remains the most attractive foreign stock exchange, Russian companies have 
also explored other exchanges. The mobile telecommunications providers Mobile 
TeleSystems and Vimpel-Communications (BeeLine), the iron and steel producer Mechel and 
food and beverages producer Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods float on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). Vimpel started floating in May 2010. 
In the same year (January 2010), United Company Rusal, the world’s second largest 
aluminium company, became listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). The 
company chose for Hong Kong as it expected to attract Chinese investors and China is the 
world’s largest aluminium consumer. Although headquartered in Moscow, Rusal is 
incorporated at Jersey, Crown dependency, from where its financial Centre operates. 
Therefore the company is listed on HKEx as a company incorporated in Jersey, with a 
principal office in Hong Kong, without any reference to Russia. 
Overall, regarding floating on (foreign) stock exchanges, despite improvements in the 
economic climate, risks are still too high for many companies. It is possible to expect some 
growth but only in comparison to 2008-2010. Companies may be listed in order to repay debts 
and to realise investment programmes because it is very hard to finance them by means of 
credits, since banks issue credits only for short time and under high interest rate. Besides, 
certain companies do not have a chance to take out a loan at all and such opportunity will 
hardy be available for them soon. 
In this respect, some businesses lag behind expectations. For example, the state-run rail 
monopoly, Russian Railways, has announced a delay of its IPO until 2011 at least. In the 
same fashion, the iron ore and steel producer Metalloinvest has scrapped IPO plans altogether. 
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Table 7 Russian companies listed on LSE and NYSE (as of 30 November, 2010) 
 
London Stock Exchange 
List Date Company Sector Market Capita-
lisation £m 
2010    
12-11-2010 Transcontainer OJSC      Industrial Transportation 151.02 
11-11-2010 Mail.Ru Group LTD            Company Bonds --- 
05-11-2010 O'Key Group SA           Food & Drug Retailers 343.611 
2009    
06-07-2009 Rushydro OJSC Electricity 9150.89 
2008    
12-08-2008 Acron JSC Chemicals 0.59 
22-04-2008 Magnit OJSC Food & Drug Retailers 472.69 
2007    
16-11-2007 LSR Group OJSC Construction & Materials 260.87 
08-11-2007 Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port Industrial Transportation 187.667 
19-10-2007 Uralkali JSC Banks 7371.95 
04-10-2007 OGK 2 Electricity 57.95 
06-06-2007 PIK Group OJSC Real Estate Investment & Services 88.88 
17-05-2007 VTB Bank JSC Banks 21376.45 
11-05-2007 Pharmastandard OJSC Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 917.00 
30-04-2007 Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Works Industrial Metals 7147.71 
13-02-2007 Sitronics JSC Technology Hardware & Equipment 15.94 
12-02-2007 Polymetal OJSC Mining 774.69 
2006    
18-12-2006 Polyus Zoloto OAO Mining 2959.26 
14-11-2006 Severstal OAO Industrial Metals 9150.15 
13-11-2006 Chelyabinsk Elektrolit Zink Plant Industrial Metals 30.72 
08-11-2006 Sistema-Hals JSC  Real Estate Investment & Services 39.21 
03-11-2006 TMK OAO Industrial Metals 446.89 
19-07-2006 Rosneft OJSC Oil & Gas Producers 40705.08 
15-05-2006 Cherkizovo Group (OJSC) Food Producers 261.03 
13-02-2006 Comstar United Telesystem Fixed Line Telecommunications 1692.04 
2005    
15-12-2005 Novolipetsk Iron and Steel Corp Industrial Metals 14288.58 
27-07-2005 Novatek OAO Oil & Gas Producers 18360.73 
14-02-2005 Sistema JSFC Mobile Telecommunications 8204.12 
2003    
30-09-2003 OMZ JSC Industrial Engineering --- 
1990s    
07-05-1997 Lukoil OAO Oil & Gas Producers 60028.00 
13-12-1996 Tatneft AO Oil & Gas Producers 7210.39 
28-10-1996 Gazprom OAO Oil & Gas Producers 84584.68 
Source: www.londonstockexchange.com 
 
New York Stock Exchange 
List Date Company Sector  
07-05-2010 Mechel (ADR preferred) Iron & Steel  
16-04-2010 Vimpel-Communications Mobile Telecommunications  
29-10-2004 Mechel Iron & Steel  
08-02-2002 Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods OJSC Food Products  
30-06-2000 Mobile TeleSystems Mobile Telecommunications  
Sources: www.nyse.com 
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4. Conclusions  
The early and mid-2000s were marked by bullish behaviour of Russian multinationals on 
foreign markets characterised by acquisition of assets in the former Soviet and socialist 
republics, as well as in Western Europe and elsewhere. The global economic crisis that 
erupted in the late 2007 has affected growth of Russian companies and their foreign 
operations of emerging Russian multinationals. The largest companies have reduced their 
investment programmes. Certain Russian companies have had to withdraw their investments 
from various projects in order to repay their debts. The paper has discussed the interplay 
between two parallel developments, both critically important for the global economy – the 
global economic crisis and the internationalisation of Russian multinational companies. 
Various data sources are used in order to explore the effect of the global crisis on international 
expansion of Russian multinationals. It is important to note that the focus of the paper lies on 
the international operations (internationalisation) of emerging Russian multinationals, and not 
their responses to the crisis on the domestic Russian market (where responses were much 
harsher than abroad). Several main conclusions can be formulated. 
Conclusion 1 General outlook 
The crisis has had a moderating effect on the Russian expansion abroad. Empirics described 
in the paper show that Russian sustained decline in its outward FDI, the amount of foreign 
acquisition diminished and the number of Russian companies going public on western stock 
exchanges decreased. This contraction, however, was not radical. In many instances, 
indicators returned back to the mid-2000s level.  
Overall, it can be concluded that on one side some companies sustained financial loss and re-
though their expansion strategy, on the other hand, the crisis offered an opportunity for 
acquisition of assets abroad going down in market value. After all, Russian companies have 
been born and grown in unstable institutional and challenging business environments, many 
of them have gone through the 1998 Russian financial crisis, enabling them to develop 
resilience to adverse economic conditions that helps them overcome the consequences of the 
global economic crisis. 
The 1998 Russian crisis has led to reconfiguration of the Russian national economy, 
impacting market shares of the largest companies (banks in the first instance). In contrast, the 
global economic crisis has not led to dramatic changes in the structure of the Russian 
economy and market shares, and the current situation has been largely preserved, mainly 
owing to the decisive intervention of the Russian government. 
Conclusion 2 Russian government and state aid 
The Russian government has played a pro-active role to mitigate the negative effect of the 
crisis. State aid granted to (a select number of) Russian large and multinational companies has 
sustained and enhanced their competitive position. Given that oil and gas are of strategic 
importance to Russia, the policy-makers continue to advance the state’s influence in the 
energy sector. Specifically, Russian oil and gas multinationals benefited greatly from these 
policy measures, and re-emerged from the crisis even more financial sound. In many 
instances, the crisis enabled the Russian government to strengthen its grip over the national 
economy. This can be even referred to as ‘soft re-nationalisation’. 
While the economic crisis has halted the foreign expansion of Russian private capital, state-
owned capital strengthened its position as an investor. Companies with a controlling stake 
held by the Russian government (e.g. Gazprom, VTB Bank, Sberbank) continued their 
expansion; the state-owned entity ‘Russian Development Bank’ (VEB) has started playing a 
much more pronounced role in Russia’s foreign expansion, directly and indirectly. 
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Conclusion 3 Sectoral differences 
Russia’s raw materials companies continue to be the main category of foreign investors. 
These companies have benefited from the state support and are presently enjoying rising 
commodity prices. These factors allow them to continue their expansion abroad. Likewise, 
financial institutions who benefited from the state aid continue internationalising. Companies 
in steel manufacturing sector are visible international players too. 
However, new technologies are gaining prominence as the other main direction of Russian 
investments. Mobile telecommunications companies actively explore foreign markets, 
particularly, the CIS. Similarly, Russian companies in software, IT, internet technologies and 
media markets expand abroad. Acquisition of a stake in the social network Facebook by a 
Russian company is illustrative. 
Conclusion 4 Divestments 
The crisis has had a moderating effect on the foreign expansion of Russian multinationals too. 
Some companies had to divest their foreign assets. Basic Element, a diversified investment 
company, is a case in point. Mounting financial pressure forced Basic Element to sell the 
investment in the Canada-based auto-parts maker Magna a year after the acquisition deal to 
the bank that financed the deal. Similarly, even if Basic Element had to divest its assets 
(Strabag) in the wake of the crisis, it effectively restored its ownership and control in the late 
2010. 
As the analysis shows, several Russian companies sold minority stakes, or stakes in non-core 
assets, others compensated foreign divestments by acquisition elsewhere abroad (e.g. Lukoil’s 
sale of its gas stations network in Poland and purchase of a network in Montenegro). In total, 
it can be concluded that the global economic crisis has not led to massive divestments of 
foreign assets by Russian multinationals. 
*** 
To sum up, the emergent class of Russian multinational companies has been touched by the 
global economic crisis. However, facilitated by the Russian government, emerging Russian 
multinationals have managed to withstand the blow, and improve their competitive positions 
and financial performance. Further recovery of the Russian economy and Russian 
multinationals will depend on the performance of the world’s leading economies and the 
recovery in the emerging markets, particularly the other BRIC countries. 
The literature stream on emerging multinationals has been dynamically evolving in the recent 
years; and it has not yet reached its maturity level. Responses of emerging multinationals to 
the global economic crisis are one of the aspects of this research area. This is a new and key 
issue to address on which the extant literature remains scant. This paper makes one of the first 
steps on this promising avenue of academic research by putting together empirical evidence 
on this topic and providing descriptive analysis of these current developments. The findings 
of the study broadly correspond to the propositions of Sauvant et al (2010) regarding strategic 
responses of emerging multinationals to the crisis. More broadly, these responses should be 
seen through the prism of FSA and CSA factors of Russian multinationals; and the findings 
indicate, the CSAs were much more pronounced in the strategic response of Russian 
multinationals to the crisis. 
There is still a large potential for academic elaboration and theory-building, as a better 
understanding of this issue is a concern of scholars as well as policy makers. More 
specifically, Russian multinationals have become and will remain important players in the 
world FDI market, and the topic provides an avenue for further research. 
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